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i Supreme Court Case 
I No.200204125C 
Additional Statement of Facts 
In reply to the fact raised in Appellee's response brief, Faulkner submits the 
following additional facts: 
1. At oral argument before the trial court, Whitney attempted to argue that 
Faulkner's disclaimer was flawed in that it disclaimed an interest only in an 
estate, but not Jennie Faulkner's trust. See Hearing Transcript, 14 March 
2002, p. 5-6, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
2. Whitney had only raised this argument for the first time in a reply brief, 
giving Faulkner no opportunity to respond or rebut the argument. Faulkner 
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objected to this tactic at the hearing. Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, p. 40 
("it's interesting that that particular argument is not articulated, we have a 
five inch stack of pleadings, not articulated until the very last pleading that 
we don't get a chance to respond to. That's a significant fact."). 
The trial court agreed with Faulkner's objection: "I did agree with Mr. 
Smith's analysis, Ms. Slawson, on the fact that you did cover something in 
your rebuttal that wasn't raised in, in the original and, and wasn't 
considered by him in his materials, and from a procedural point frankly I felt 
a little uncomfortable with that." Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, p. 46. 
The trial court's conclusions of law do not make the conclusion that the 
Disclaimer itself was in any way void or inadequate but only that the prior 
receipt of personalty made any disclaimer legally impossible. To the 
contrary, the findings predicate the trial court's decision on two points: (a) 
the acceptance of trivial items of personalty absolutely precluded any 
disclaimer of any other part of the trust estate; and (b) since Faulkner's wife 
obtained the property he disclaimed, he could not disclaim and confer the 
benefit on her. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Conclusion 
fflj 5, 7, and 10, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
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5. Notwithstanding the trial court's gentle rejection of Whitney's tactic of 
raising a new argument in a reply brief and notwithstanding the 
concomitant fact that the issue was therefore never properly raised below, 
Whitney now gives this argument the honor of primacy in his brief. See 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 14-16. 
6. Taken as a whole, Faulkner's disclaimer plainly disclaimed his interest in 
his mother's trust estate. It provided: 
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner is a beneficiary of the Trust of 
Jennie A. Faulkner dated 29 December 1992, and amended on 18 
July 1997; and 
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner's beneficial interest is a joint 
interest with his wife, Renee Faulkner; and 
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner desires to renounce and 
relinquish all right, title, interest or claim as a beneficiary of the estate 
or trust of Jennie A. Faulkner, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-
801. 
Now therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801,1, Lawrence C. Faulkner, hereby 
renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all my right, title, interest, 
or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner as 
though I had predeceased her. 
DATED this 4 day of April [sic: May], 2001. 
/s/ Lawrence C. Faulkner 
A copy of re Disclaimer is attached as Exhibit C. 
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Summary of Argument 
Faulkner's disclaimer was valid, timely and effective. The trial court erred 
in failing to give it effect. Rather than joining issue on this central point, Whitney 
confuses the issue by discussing an erroneous standard of review. Whitney then 
presents an argument that the trial court refused to consider because Whitney 
had failed to brief, except in a reply memo; accordingly, the issue was not 
preserved for appeal. The bedrock of the trial court's decision, as urged on it by 
Whitney, was that the acceptance of any property or benefit under the Trust 
absolutely preclude any disclaimer. This conclusion is simply wrong; without this 
point, Whitney's entire basis for rejecting the effect of Faulkner's disclaimer 
evaporates. The error inherent in this conclusion is pointedly illustrated by the 
supporting argument Whitney advanced that since Faulkner is supported by his 
wife, he could not disclaim in her favor. This surprisingly gender-biased 
argument is without support in the disclaimer statute and is inconsistent with long-
standing Utah law and policy. 
Whitney's attempt to gain prejudgment interest on the garnishment 
judgment is also infirm. Whitney's argument finds no support in the language of 
Rule 64D nor in any Utah appellate decision. Instead, Whitney's argument 
amounts to nothing more than a sophistic argument without any legal, factual or 
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policy support. To the contrary, Whitney is asking this court to grant him a double 
recovery: interest on his full judgment -without discount, accruing at every 
moment during the pendency of the garnishment proceeding- and interest on the 
garnishment -without discount and accruing at every moment since the 
garnishment was served. Whitney fails to address where in Rule 64D any 
support for his position exists. Whitney's argument would turn garnishment 
practice on its head since, under Whitney's theory, every judgment creditor would 
be entitled to interest from the garnishment defendant from the moment of service 
of the writ. Financial institutions would suddenly be incurred large interest 
obligations from every garnishment. Whitney's request for prejudgment interest 
is silly. The trial court rightly rejected it and should be affirmed. 
Argument 
I. This Appeal Presents No Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, but 
Simply Questions of Law, Subject to De Novo Review. 
The judgment and order of the District Court should be reviewed for 
correctness. The issue before this Court is whether Defendant Larry Faulkner's, 
("Faulkner's,") renunciation of interest in his Mother's estate was sufficient to 
comply with the statutory requirements of Utah law. Matters of statutory 
construction are reviewed for correctness with no deference given to the trial 
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court. See. America First Credit Union v. Dep't of Financial Institutions. 2001 UT 
App 272,1J6, 33 P.3d 390. (Citations omitted.) 
Whitney's arguments regarding the standard of review simply obscures the 
nature of this appeal. Faulkner does not challenge any of the trial court's 
"Findings of Fact." However, it is a matter of record that the trial court did not 
conduct a trial or make any true factual findings. To the contrary, this case was 
decided based upon virtually undisputed facts. While not articulated as such, this 
case decided on the basis of a summary judgment standard. As such, this court 
is presented exclusively with issues of law for decision. 
Whitney attempts to obscure the proper standard of review, arguing that 
the trial court was presented with a mixed question of law and fact. In so doing, 
Whitney relies on State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994). Pena outlines the 
factors to be considered when determining whether a degree of discretion ought 
to be left to the trial court on a given matter. The Pena court wrote: 
A number of reasons ... are useful in discerning when some degree of 
discretion ought to be left to a trial court: (I) when the facts to which the 
legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule 
adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out; 
(ii) when the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is 
sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate 
and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative; 
and (iii) when the trial judge has observed "facts," such as a witness's 
appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that 
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cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to the appellate 
courts. 
id. at 938-39. (Citations omitted.) The Pena court also noted that interests 
weighing in favor of giving a trial court discretion must be counterbalanced by the 
need for uniform interpretation of legal rules. ]d. at 939. 
The case before this Court has no resemblance to any of the issues 
identified in Pena. The facts in this matter are not complex, but are 
straightforward and undisputed.1 There were no material disputes, nor 
evidentiary hearings held to establish the facts in this matter before the trial court. 
For this reason, there were no issues, which the trial court judge was in a better 
position to observe, and which cannot be adequately reflected in the record 
before this Court. Finally, issues involving renunciation of interests in estates are 
nothing new to the appellate courts. The doctrine has existed since the common 
law, and this case is not one where an appellate court is unable to anticipate what 
factors should be outcome determinative. 
1. Appellees incorrectly assert that Appellants take issue with the lower 
court's factual determinations. For purposes of this appeal, as noted above, 
Appellants have no objection to the purely factual findings made by the lower 
court. Appellant's brief in chief did refer to the fact that certain of the trial court's 
"Findings" were made on the basis of conflicting evidence- which is a serious 
anomaly given the fact that there was no trial and therefore no actual fact-finding 
which occurred. 
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Indeed, this case presents a straight forward legal question for resolution. 
Specifically, the issue is whether an individual can accept some portion of 
personalty passing through an estate, and subsequently disclaim his interest in 
the remaining portion of the estate, which passes through a separate provision of 
the will. Moreover, this is the type of case that "the appellate court decides ... for 
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." 
id. at 936. 
II. Whitney Wrongfully Raises Arguments For the First Time On Appeal 
The first three pages of Whitney's argument is dedicated to demonstrating 
that Faulkner's Disclaimer was ineffective to waive any interest in Jennie 
Faulkner's trust. This argument was not properly raised or briefed by Whitney 
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before the trial court and should not be considered on appeal.2 Moreover, it is 
simply wrong. 
Whitney raised his argument that the Disclaimer is ineffective to disclaim 
any interest due to its wording -an argument even Whitney's counsel conceded 
was "very technical" for the first time in a reply brief and at oral argument in the 
trial court Exhibit A, Hearing Transcript, p.5, 40. Faulkner's counsel objected 
and the trial court sustained the objection. |d. p. 40, 46. Whitney's argument was 
never briefed by Whitney, subject to counter argument by Faulkner or considered 
by the trial court. It was not part of the trial court's Findings. 
Notwithstanding the impropriety of raising this issue as a new issue in a 
reply brief and the trial court's gentle rejection of Whitney's scheme, Whitney now 
unfairly again raises this issue. His failure to raise the issue below, except in a 
reply brief, precludes consideration of the issue now. See U.P.C.. Inc. v. R.O.A. 
2. Perhaps in recognition that this issue was not properly brief and not 
considered by the trial court, Whitney claims, in his brief to this court, to have 
"raised" this issue before the trial court. Whitney's Opening Brief, p. 14 n.2. 
Whitney provides a citation to the record, pages 822 through 825. These four 
pages are a portion of a reply brief filed by Whitney six days prior to the oral 
arguments before the trial court on 14 March 2002. In fact, the next item in the 
court record, page 836, is the court's minute entry following the oral argument. 
As noted hereinafter, raising an issue for the first time in a reply brief is not 
appropriate and the trial court rejected this tactic. It is equally fallacious to claim 
to have raised an issue below by this sort of maneuver. 
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General. Inc.. 1999 UT App. 303, fflf 63-64, 990 P.2d 945 (discussing impropriety 
of raising an issue for the first time in a reply memorandum). See also, State v. 
Kruqer. 2000 UT 60, U 21,6 P.3d 1116 (discussing similar rule applying to reply 
briefs on appeal). 
Nevertheless, Whitney's argument is a red herring. It focuses on a single 
word in the entire document: "estate." Whitney then concludes that this word, in 
the disclaimer provision, cannot apply to a trust estate. Of course, to reach this 
point, Whitney must ignore the express recitals and the fact that the trust itself 
was attached to the Disclaimer. Whitney's argument simply picks a single word, 
ignores the rest of the document, and then constructs a strawman around his 
artificial construct. This arcane and -in Whitney's counsel's description- "very 
technical" argument should be rejected. The document should be read as any 
other document, as an organic whole, to give effect, where possible, to all its 
provisions. 
This court should refuse to consider Whitney's unbriefed, improperly 
raised, ill-considered and erroneous argument. It has no place in the analysis of 
this case. 
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III. Appellant Larry Faulkner Effectively Renounced his Remaining 
Interest in his Mother's Estate. 
Faulkner's Disclaimer was effective under Utah law. Whitney has cited no 
authority by which a claimant cannot partially disclaim his interest in an estate. 
Nor has Whitney cited any authority to suggest that Faulkner cannot accept 
property passing under one provision of a trust, while disclaiming property under 
a separate provision of the trust. Moreover, Whitney has attempted to justify their 
position solely by obscuring the correct standard of review and misconstruing the 
import of legal authority cited in Appellant's Opening Brief. Case law and sound 
legal analysis unambiguously supports Faulkner's position. 
First, Whitney argues that First Nat'l Bank of Houston v. Toombs. 431 
S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968) falls contrary to Faulkner's position, asserting 
that the Texas trial court disallowed the disclaimer. This is not the case. The 
Toombs court analyzed the nature of the several gifts, some accepted and some 
disclaimed, and held that a disclaimant may accept some beneficial provisions 
under a will, while disclaiming other burdensome provisions, if the gifts are 
separate and independent. The court found the renunciations challenged before 
it were "timely, valid, enforceable, and legally binding." ]d. at 407. Indeed, like 
the instant matter, the disclaimants in Toombs received separate and 
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independent devises, and opted to accept the benefit of one, while later rejecting 
the other. 
In re Womble. 289 B.R. 836 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2003), is similarly in line with 
Faulkner's position. In Womble, the disclaimant unilaterally disclaimed all interest 
he was entitled to under the estate, even after having accepted a benefit 
previously from the estate, id. at 850. Contrary to Whitney's suggestion, Texas, 
has requirements similar to Utah's for describing property to be disclaimed. Tex. 
Prob. Code Ann. §37A(e) (2003) states, "[A] partial disclaimer shall be effective 
only with respect to property expressly described or referred to by category..." Cf. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801. Womble determined that the disclaimer it faced was 
sufficient stating, "Womble's alleged acceptance as a beneficiary of the Bentley 
homestead prior to executing the disclaimer does not invalidate the disclaimer as 
a whole." Womble at 850. 
The other cases Whitney cites from Faulkners' brief illustrate Faulkner's 
point from the opposite side. For example, in Badouh v. Hale. 22 S.W.2d 392 
(Tex. 2000), the disclaimer was rejected because the disclaimant had already 
exercised dominion and control over the very property the disclaimant sought to 
disclaim. In this case, at most, Faulkner exercised dominion over trivial items of 
personalty, passing under a specific provision of the trust, and disclaimed real 
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estate sales proceeds passing under the residuary clause of the trust That is not 
the case here, where Larry Faulkner received nothing under the provision of his 
mother's estate that he sought to renounce. Likewise, in Bank of Delaware v. 
Smith. 211 A.2d 591 (Del.Ch. 1965), the renunciation was ineffective because the 
gift was a single, aggregate gift, over which the disclaimant had already exercised 
partial control. It is undisputed that in this case, Faulkner never had any control 
or dominion over the home or the sales proceeds from the home. Unlike Badouh 
and Bank of Delaware. Faulkner did not exercise dominion over the property to 
be disclaimed, did not accept such property or any benefit under such property, 
and therefore, never lost the right to disclaim it. 
In the instant matter, the Trust had separate provisions governing the 
distribution of her personal property and the residue of her estate. Whitney does 
violence to the Trust by conflating these two provisions and arguing that any 
acceptance of any property under a Trust precludes any disclaimer. Article 
III.2.C. of the Trust governed the distribution of personal property and household 
effects. Once personalty was distributed it was no longer part of Jennie 
Faulkner's trust estate. Article III.2.D, as amended, provides for a separate 
distribution of the remainder of the trust. 
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Larry Faulkner properly renounced his interest in that separate provision of 
the trust, explicitly referencing the Amendment, which dealt only with that 
provision of the trust, and renouncing all right, title, interest, or claim therein. 
Indeed, because property had already been distributed under the provisions of 
the trust, the only remaining portion of the trust estate in which Larry Faulkner 
had any interest at the time of his disclaimer fell under Article III.2.D, as 
amended. Larry Faulkner renounced his entire interest therein, and his 
renunciation was legally effective under Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801 to disclaim 
Faulkner's remaining interest in her mother's trust and estate. 
Whitney never really joins issue on this point. It is undisputed that Faulkner 
accepted some items of personalty under Article III.2.C of the Trust. It is 
undisputed that the gifts of personalty are physically and legally separate and 
distinct from the real property and real property proceeds. It is also undisputed 
that Faulkner had no role in the sale of the house or ever accepted any of the 
proceeds from the sale of the home. Whitney simply aggregates these separate 
items of property and the separate terms of the Trust without comment, as the 
unstated assumption of his argument. This argument is without legal or factual 
support and should be rejected. Case law uniformly stands for the principle that 
one can accept some property and disclaim other property so long as the gifts are 
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divisible. These fact being undeniable in this case, there was no impediment to 
Whitney's disclaimer of all his right, title, interest or claim as a beneficiary." 
Exhibit C. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise. 
IV. The Trial Court Erred in Ruling that Mr. Faulkner Could Not Disclaim 
in Favor of his Wife. 
In its Conclusions of Law, drafted by Whitney's counsel, the district court 
held: 
The Court finds, alternatively that Mr. Faulkner obtained a benefit from the 
Trust in that Mr. Faulkner receives all of his support and maintenance from 
his wife who is the other residuary beneficiary of the Trust. Mr. Faulkner's 
receipt of a benefit from the Trust bars and invalidates his disclaimer of the 
Trust property. 
Conclusion of Law No. 7, Exhibit C. Interestingly, Whitney's' counsel would now 
treat this conclusion as a finding of fact as well. While a determination that Mr. 
Faulkner received a benefit from trust property may be a finding of fact, the 
Court's conclusion that Mr. Faulkner's renunciation was invalidated because of 
the purely theoretical and "very technical" notion that Faulkner may derivatively 
benefit from his wife's good fortune in inheriting from her mother-in-law.3 
3. Taken to its logical conclusion, this argument dissolves all bands of 
separate property between spouses. For example, if my wife inherits the house 
in which we live, my creditor may argue, under Whitney's theory, that since I 
15 
Whitney cites no authority, other than a questionable interpretation of the 
statute, that would preclude a husband from disclaiming in favor of a wife, or vice 
versa. This interpretation runs directly counter to the rights of married persons to 
hold property and income free from the reach of the other spouse's creditors 
under Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-5(2) (2003). Whitney has provided no response to 
the applicability of this statute, or to the other arguments made concerning a 
wife's rights under Utah law. However, application of Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-
801(5) (2003) in the manner suggested by Whitney would run in direct violation of 
these well-established principles. As such, the trial court's legal determination 
concerning renunciation in favor of a spouse is in error and should be reversed by 
this Court. 
V. Whitney is Not Entitled to Prejudgment interest. 
In his Cross Appeal, Whitney argues that the trial judge erred in failing to 
award prejudgment interest. Even if Whitney were correct in asserting that funds 
should have been withheld from Jennie Faulkner's estate, there is no legal basis 
for exacting prejudgment interest of Renee Faulkner, as a garnishee. 
benefit from having a place to live, my wife's property is now subject to my 
creditor's claims. In this case, that is the exact effect of Whitney's argument. 
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Whitney correctly assert that in Utah, the Courts have held that the award 
or denial of prejudgment interest is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. 
See. Lvon v. Burton. 2000 UT 55, lf73, 5 P.3d 616; Cornia v. Wilcox. 898 P.2d 
1379,1387 (Utah 1995). However, this standard of review runs directly counter 
to those of several other states who hold that determinations of prejudgment 
interest should only be reversed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Dillon v. 
Montgomery. 67 P.3d 93, 96 (Idaho 2003); Blair Const.. Inc. v. McBeth. 44 P.3d 
1244, 1251-52 (Kan. 2002); Musto v. Vidas. 754 A.2d 586, 598 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2000); Purcell Const.. Inc. v. Welch. 17 S.W.3d 398, 402 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2000); Pauley v. Gilbert. 522 S.E.2d 208, 213 (W.Va. 1999); Bopp v. Brames. 
713 N.E.2d 866, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999); Ditto v. McCurdv. 947 P.2d 961, 979 
(Haw. Ct. App. 1997); In re Estate of Wernick. 535 N.E.2d 876, 888 (III. 1989). 
Moreover, given the inherently factual nature of the determination of prejudgment 
interest under this state's Case law, as will be discussed herein, this Court would 
do well do change the standard of review accordingly. 
However, regardless of the standard of review, Whitney cannot establish 
entitlement to prejudgment interest. First, the authorities cited by Whitney do not 
apply to the instant matter. Whitney relies on Utah Code Ann. §15-1-1 (2003). 
The plain language of this statute limits its application to actions involving 
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contract. Furthermore, while §15-1-1 establishes a default rate of interest at ten 
percent, it does not create an independent right to interest where none otherwise 
exists. See. Vali Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Div. of Health Care 
Financing. 797 P.2d 438, 445 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Second, Whitney's' reliance on archaic Case law is utterly misplaced. 
Under Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co.. 24 P. 586 (1890), the Court 
found that interest may be allowed in the absence of statute or contract. 
However, this decision, which pre-dates statehood does not create a right to 
prejudgment interest, nor does it comport with stricter requirements placed on 
awards of prejudgment interest since that time. Moreover, Wasatch Mining in no 
way analyzes or comports with the provisions of Rule 64D. An analysis of the 
rules governing garnishments, and the case law rules governing awards of 
prejudgment interest demonstrates that the trial court correctly denied Whitney 
the relief sought. In fact, while Whitney cites to numerous cases in the portion of 
his brief claiming a right to interest, Whitney is unable to cite to a single case in 
which any Utah court has ever awarded interest on a garnishment. This is true 
for a simple reason: there are none. 
Whitney's misplaced interest claim stems from his utter misapprehension of 
the effect of a garnishment. Whitney states, in his brief, that "Ms. Faulkner owed 
18 
Mr. Faulkner, and thus Mr. Whitney." Whitney Brief, p. 31. Utah law is clear that 
a garnishment plaintiff stands in the same shoes as the garnishment defendant 
with respect to the judgment debtor, becoming, in effect, subrogated to the 
garnishment defendant. Lang v. Lang. 403 P.2d 655, 657 & n.3 (Utah 1965), 
quoting Nat'l Bank of Tucson v. Reininoer Mining & Smelting Co.. 295 P. 79, 80 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1931). However, Whitney does not acquire more rights than 
Faulkner would have had against Renee. Renee promptly disbursed the trust 
upon receipt of the sales proceeds. Faulkner would have had no claim for 
prejudgment interest against Renee; accordingly, neither does Whitney. 
The express terms of Rule 64D strongly indicate that no prejudgment 
interest may be granted against a garnishee defendant. For example, under the 
provisions to ascertain whether property is exempt from garnishment or not 
subject to garnishment, if the court concludes that the property may be garnished 
"it shall issue an order to pay the Property Subject to Garnishment directly to 
plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney or as otherwise ordered by the court." Utah R. Civ. 
P. 64D(h)(iii). Similarly, if matters other than exemptions or ownership of 
garnished property are raised, following the resolution of the dispute, "judgment 
shall be entered upon the verdict or finding the same as if the garnishee had 
answered according to such verdict or finding." Utah R. Civ. P. 64D(I). In either 
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case, only the Property Subject to Garnishment is to be paid over. There is no 
mention of any interest because no interest is intended under the rule. 
In the context of a post-judgment collection garnishment, like the present 
case, this makes great sense. Since a judgment is already in place, the judgment 
creditor is fully protected in that the judgment is incurring interest at the lawful 
post-judgment rate. When a garnishment is issued to a third party, interest 
continues on the whole judgment until the garnishment proceeds are paid over; 
the judgment creditor thus recovers a full measure of compensation. 
Whitney's argument unfairly and impermissibly creates, in effect, two 
judgments: the original judgment, upon which the writ of garnishment issued and 
a new, second judgment, arising from the writ itself. So, in this case, Whitney's 
argument goes, he is entitled to post-judgment interest on his $500,000+ 
judgment and additionally, post-judgment interest on the $29,000.00 
garnishment, for exactly the same time period. Thus, during the two years this 
matter has been pending, Whitney claims entitlement to interest on both the 
$500,000 judgment and the $29,000 garnishment. This claim is, as noted above, 
utterly without support in the law. 
Furthermore, an allowance of prejudgment interest against a garnishee 
runs contrary to the reasoning underlying judicial rules allowing its award. Under 
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Utah Case law, prejudgment interest has specific, defined purposes. "As a 
matter of public policy, award of prejudgment interest simply serves to 
compensate a party for the depreciating value of the amount owed over time and, 
as a corollary, deters parties from intentionally withholding an amount that is 
liquidated and owing." Trail Mountain Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands and 
Forestry, 921 P.2d 1365,1370 (Utah 1996). See, also. Campbell. Maack & 
Sessions v. DeBrv. 2001 UT App 397,1J23, 38 P.3d 984; Lefavi v. Bertoch. 2000 
UT App 5, H24, 994 P.2d 817; Baker v. Dataphase. 781 F.Supp. 724, 731 
(D.Utah 1992). 
Whitney's argument would play havoc with the trial courts. Suddenly, 
every time a writ of garnishment issued, a new judgment would be created. 
When a bank or credit union received a writ of garnishment on an account, 
suddenly, the bank or credit union itself would be liable for interest on the 
garnished amount, even through the rule itself allows the bank to wait for a 
garnishee release order. Whitney's argument makes no allowance for these 
practical considerations. 
Of course, these practical considerations have grown up around Rule 64D 
itself. Garnishee defendants are required to answer the writ and interrogatories. 
If there is a dispute, upon resolution, the Garnishee Defendant is liable, at most, 
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for the Property Subject to Garnishment. The judgment creditor is fully protected 
by the fact that the judgment continues to accrue interest. However, the mere 
fact that there is a dispute to resolve does not create a new right to additional 
interest. Such, however, is exactly Whitney's argument. 
There is simply no basis for an award of interest. Rule 64D does not so 
provide and indeed, strongly indicates no such entitlement. The mere fact that 
Whitney's primary legal support is a case predating statehood and the adoption of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is also a strong indication that Whitney's 
argument is misplaced. Practical considerations and basic fairness should doom 
Whitney's efforts to obtain a double recovery. The cross-appeal should be 
rejected and the trial court's refusal to grant post-judgment interest on both the 
underlying judgment and the garnished funds should be affirmed. 
Conclusion 
Mr. Faulkner executed a valid renunciation of interest, which specifically 
disclaimed his interest in the remainder of his mother's Trust Estate, which 
passed under a separate residuary clause. Mr. Faulkner's prior acceptance of 
personal property did not affect or limit his ability to disclaim under Utah Code 
Ann. §75-2-801. Nor was Mr. Faulkner prevented from disclaiming his interest 
22 
where the benefit would pass to his wife. Mr. Faulkner's renunciation should be 
given full legal effect and the trial court's decision reversed in that regards. As to 
prejudgment interest, there is no basis under Utah law for an award of 
prejudgment interest against Renee Faulkner as garnishee. There is no provision 
for such an award under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and this case does not 
satisfy the Case law requirements for prejudgment interest in this state. 
Oral Argument Requested. 
DATED this f day of / \U f l , 2003. 
CLfBrad C.Smith 
Attorney for Appellants 
Certificate of Service 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Appellant's Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this 1 day of jQJA* 2003, to the 
following: , 'J 
Kira M. Slawson 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C. 
77 West 200 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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LARRY FAULKNER, et al, 
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Appeal 20020412-SC 
Judge Stanton M. Taylor 
BE IT REMEMBERED that this matter came on for hearing 
before the above-named court on March 14, 2002. 
WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by 
counsel, the following proceedings were held: 
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deals, that came from a trust. If the property is devolved 
to the person by revocable trust the statute requires that 
the written disclaimer generally must be made within nine 
months that the revocable trust became irrevocable. In this 
case that would have been the date of death. The disclaimer 
must be delivered to the person who has legal title to the 
property. In this case that would be the trustee, Ranae 
Faulkner. And it must be delivered in person or by certified 
or registered mail in order for it to be a valid 
disclaimer. 
Because the Utah disclaimer statute has different 
procedures for property that devolves by will or intestacy 
and property that devolves by trust or contract, the intended 
disclaimant must properly designate the specific property 
being disclaimed and strictly comply with the statutory 
requirements particular to that kind of property. 
It is undisputed in this case that Mr. Faulkner is 
the beneficiary of his mother's estate. It is also 
undisputed that he is a named beneficiary of her trust, and 
that's the Jenny A. Faulkner trust that I'm referring to. 
On May 4th of 2001 Larry Faulkner's attorney 
prepared an instrument entitled Renunciation of Interest, and 
this was prepared purportedly in compliance with Utah Code 
Annotated 75-2-801. Although the recitals of the 
renunciation of interest state that Mr. Faulkner quote: 
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"desires to renounce and relinquish all 
right, title and interest or claim as a 
beneficiary of the estate or trust of 
Jenny A. Faulkner pursuant to Utah code." 
Mr. Faulkner did not effectively renunciate his 
interest as the beneficiary of the trust. Rather, the 
renunciation stated in the body of the renunciation now, not 
the recitals but the actual renunciation, renunciation itself 
stated: 
"Now, therefor, in consideration of the 
foregoing and pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated 75-2-801, I, Lawrence C. 
Faulkner hereby renounce, relinquish and 
otherwise forfeit all my right, title and 
interest or claim as a beneficiary of the 
estate of Jenny A. Faulkner as though I 
had predeceased her." 
The language of Mr. Faulkner's renunciation only 
disclaims his interest as a beneficiary of the estate, not as 
a beneficiary of the trust. 
Now, Your Honor, I realize this is a very technical 
argument. But in order for a disclaimer to be valid it must 
comply strictly with the technical requirements of the 
statute. Let's turn this whole thing around. If 
Mr. Faulkner were standing before this Court seeking a 
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indicated, it seems to me there's no warrant in the law that 
says it has to be strict and hypertechnical. Now certainly 
there are things in the law that we have to do that with. 
This statute, however, says nothing about that. 
It should be noted this statute is in derogation of 
the common law. At common law you had no right to disclaim 
your interest in a trust. The public policy of this state 
is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be 
literally construed, not strictly and hypertechnically 
construed. 
And so in this case I think if they want to now 
point out, and I have to emphasize this, this argument that 
while the language of the disclaimer itself... And 
admittedly this is cutting close to my particular bone 
because after all I wrote the dang thing. But if we're 
saying now that there's a problem with that language, it's 
interesting that that particular argument is not articulated, 
we have a five inch stack of pleadings, not articulated until 
the very last pleading that we don't get a chance to respond 
to. That's a significant fact. 
But it seems to me it also would be incumbent if 
we're talking about a substantial compliance sort of 
analysis, somehow they have to show some prejudice that 
somehow somewhere somebody has been prejudiced as a result of 
our failure to strictly and hypertechnically comply with the 
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you know, completely clear. I think, I think this is makes 
the most sense, at least it does to me. Perhaps the Supreme 
Court or the Court of Appeals might very well disagree. 
MS. SLAWSON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. And, and I, I would have 
to say, Counsel, that, that the written materials were most 
helpful (short inaudible, no mic). 
I did, I did agree with Mr. Smith's analysis, 
Ms. Slawson, on the fact that you did cover something in your 
rebuttal that wasn't raised in, in the original and, and 
wasn't considered by him in his materials, and from a 
procedural point frankly I felt a little uncomfortable with 
that. 
MS. SLAWSON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Court is in recess. 
MS. SLAWSON: Thank you, Judge. 
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
Garnishee Defendant. 
This matter came before the Court on the Garnishee Defendant, Renee Faulkner's Motion 
to Quash Garnishment, and the Traverse Complaint of Plaintiffs, David C. Whitney, Whitney 
Enterprises, Inc. and Con-Blast, Inc. (herein "Whitney") on March 14,2002, at 1:30 p.m., the 
Honorable Stanton M. Taylor presiding. The parties briefed the issues in Defendant's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash, Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion 
to Quash and in Support of Traverse, Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Quash and in Opposition to Traverse, and Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum in Support of Traverse 
and in Opposition to Motion to Quash. 
The Court having reviewed the parties' memoranda and citations to the record contained 
therein, having heard oral argument in this matter, and having considered the statements and 
admissions of the parties, and being fully advised in the premises, now makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs have an outstanding unsatisfied judgment against Larry Faulkner and 
Roberta Beverly. 
2. Larry Faulkner has not been formally employed since 1993. Mr. Faulkner's 
mother, Jennie A. Faulkner, was his only source of income from 1993 until her death in 2000. 
Mr. Faulkner has not had a bank account in at least five years. 
3. For the past 24 years, Larry Faulkner has lived at 3608 West 6000 South, Roy, 
Utah with his wife, Renee Faulkner. Mr. Whitney obtained a judgment lien on the home in 
approximately June 1988, which was released by Mr. Whitney in 1988 in consideration of the 
receipt of $10,000.00. The home has been in the name of Renee Faulkner since approximately 
1991, when Larry Faulkner transferred his interest in the home to Renee Faulkner. 
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4. Larry Faulkner does not own a car, but drives a 1995 Toyota 4-Runner that 
belongs to Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner's gas money for the Toyota, at least in the year 2001, 
has come from Renee Faulkner. Larry Faulkner's spending money in the year 2001 also came 
from Renee Faulkner. 
5. Renee Faulkner pays the credit card bills for the Visa credit card and the Chevron 
credit card that Lany Faulkner uses. 
6. Presently, Renee Faulkner is Mr. Faulkner's only source of money. 
7. On December 29, 1992, Jennie A. Faulkner, the mother of defendant Larry 
Faulkner, created a trust called the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust. She transferred her house at 1255 
21* Street, Ogden, Utah (the "Home") into that trust by Warranty Deed on December 30, 1992. 
Jennie A. Faulkner amended and restated the trust on January 18, 1996 in a document entitled 
Amendment and Restatement of Trust (herein referred to as the "Trust"). Exhibit B to Faulkner's 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash. 
8. The Trust provided that upon Jennie's death, the Home in the name of the Trust 
*ras to be sold and the assets of the Trust were to be divided into three equal shares for the 
)enefit of Jennie Faulkner's three children, Marilyn Clements, Glenda Burnside, and Lany 
7aulkner. Pursuant to the Trust, items of personal and household eflfects were to be distributed to 
ndividuals as set forth in "Exhibit B" to the Trust. In the event that not all of the personal and 
lousehold items were disposed of by "Exhibit B," the personal and household items not listed on 
Exhibit B" were to go to Jennie A. Faulkner's children in approximate equal shares. 
9. On January 18, 1997, Jennie Faulkner again amended her Trust. This was the last 
mendment to the Trust. The July 18, 1997 Amendment is referred to herein as "Amendment to 
rust." See Exhibit C to Faulkner's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Quash. 
1 
10. Under the Amendment to Trust, Jennie Faulkner changed the distribution of her 
Trust. Instead of the Trust being divided equally among her three children, Jennie Faulkner left 
$30,000.00 or 30% (whichever was less) of the Trust estate to her two daughters and grandsons, 
and the remaining 70% to "Lawrence and Renee A. Faulkner." In the event that either Lawrence 
or Renee predeceased Jennie, the survivor was to succeed to the entire 70% interest in the Trust 
estate. 
11. Jennie A. Faulkner died on November 9,2000. 
12. Renee Faulkner was appointed successor trustee under the terms of the Trust. 
13. On November 18, 2000, Larry Faulkner, Glenda Burnside, Christie Zabriski, 
"Ray" Pete Clements, Ronnie Clements, and Frank Zabriski met at Jennie's home to distribute 
the personal property. 
14. Some of the personal property of the Trust was located at Jennie's home, and the 
remainder of the personal property was located at the home of Renee and Larry Faulkner. The 
property located at Jennie's Home was distribute at the November 18th meeting to the three 
children, Glenda, Lany, and Marilyn or their representatives, and the children took possession of 
the property. 
15. On November 19, 2000, there was a meeting at Renee and Larry Faulkner's house. 
The purpose of this meeting was to distribute the personal property which was referred to on 
"Exhibit B" to the Trust, which had not been distributed at the meeting the day before. 
16. Present at the November 19, 2000 meeting were Renee Faulkner, Larry Faulkner, 
Christie Zabriski, and Glenda Burnside. 
17. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Glenda Burnside would receive the 
following property from the Trust: 
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a. Castle picture; 
b. Hutch with China and table settings; 
c. Wedding rings - original; 
d. Diamond earrings; and 
e. White rug. 
18. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Glenda Burnside's child, Mike, would 
receive the VCR from the Trust. 
19. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Lany and Renee Faulkner would receive 
the following personal property from the Trust: 
a. Solitaire diamond; 
b. Diamond necklace; 
c. Bookcases; 
d. Microwave; 
e. Silverware; 
£ Anniversary clock; and 
g. Orange and green rug. 
20. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Renee Faulkner would receive a "ring" and 
any vehicle owned by Jennie Faulkner or the Trust at the time of Jennie's death, from the Trust. 
21. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Larry's child, Ben, would receive the stereo 
from the Trust. 
22. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Larry's child, Chris, would receive the 
VCR/Cassette holder from the Trust. 
23. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Marilyn Clements would receive the 
following personal property from the Trust: 
a. Black onyx ring with diamond; 
b. Smoke lamp; 
c. Plaques on the wall (butterfly and flower); and 
d. Saw clock. 
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24. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Marilyn's child, Chris, would receive a 
"ring" from the Trust. 
25. "Exhibit B" to the Trust provided that Marilyn's child, Robin, would also receive 
"ring" from the Trust. 
26. On November 19,2000, the items from "Exhibit B" to the Trust designated for 
Glenda Bumside, Marilyn Clements, Marilyn's daughter Chris, and Marilyn's daughter Robin 
were distributed to Glenda Bumside on behalf of Glenda, Marilyn, Chris, and Robin. 
27. On approximately January 14, 2001, Trustee Renee Faulkner prepared an 
inventory of the Jennie Faulkner Estate and an accounting of the distributions made from the 
Trust (hereinafter referred to as "List of Distributions''). Exhibit 7 to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Support of Traverse and in Opposition to Motion to Quash. 
28. The List of Distributions was prepared to demonstrate how the personal property 
of the Jennie A. Faulkner Trust had been distributed. 
29. The List of Distributions indicates that specific items of personal property were 
distributed to Glenda Bumside, Marilyn Clements and Larry Faulkner. 
30. As set forth in the List of Distributions, Larry Faulkner personally took possession 
of several items of personal property from the Trust, including the "Exhibit B" items, television 
and TV stand, mattress, towels, camera, binoculars, yard tools, clock, wood mirrors, various 
pictures, crystal nut dishes, tablecloths, kiln, various figurines and knickknacks, hide-a-bed, 
Christmas lights, vacuum cleaner, patio swing, bed, and mirror. 
31. Larry Faulkner also received Jennie A. Faulkner's opal ring. 
32. The home of Jennie A. Faulkner (owned by the Trust) was sold in April 2001, and 
the proceeds of sale were delivered to Renee Faulkner as Trustee on May I, 2001. The net 
proceeds of the sale of the home were $84,635.05, and there was an additional $1,820.58 cash 
from a Trust bank account which was held by the Trustee. The total cash in the Trust estate was 
$86,455.63 as of May 2, 2001. 
33. On May 2, 2001, Orders in Supplemental Proceedings were issued against Roberta 
Beverly and Larry Faulkner. 
34. On May 4,2001, Roberta Beverly was served with an Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings in this case which ordered her to not dispose of any of her assets pending the hearing. 
35. On May 4, 2001, Renee Faulkner as Trustee directed her attorney, Brad Smith, to 
distribute the cash assets from the Trust to the beneficiaries as follows: 
a. Glenda Burnside: $10,000.00; 
b. Marilyn Clements: $5,000.00; 
c. Benjamin Faulkner: $8,645.56; 
d. Christopher Faulkner: $4,322.78; and 
e. Renee Faulkner: $58,487.29. 
36. On May 10, 2001, an Order in Supplemental Proceedings was served on Larry 
aulkner, and a Writ of Garnishment was served on Renee Faulkner in her individual capacity as 
arnishee. 
37. The Order in Supplemental Proceedings served on Larry Faulkner on May 10, 
301, restrained Mr. Faulkner from assigning or disposing of any of his assets prior to the 
lpplemental Proceedings Order hearing. 
38. The Writ of Garnishment served on Renee Faulkner, as Garnishee, attached any 
onies in her possession which belonged to Larry Faulkner, and directed that she pay such funds 
Plaintiff or the Court. 
39. At the time Renee Faulkner was served with her Writ of Garnishment, she had 
received her alleged distribution of $58,487.29 from the Trust and had deposited it into her 
personal bank account. 
40. On May 4, 2001, Larry Faulkner executed a document entitled "Renunciation of 
Interest." In the Renunciation of Interest executed by Larry Faulkner, the recitals of the 
Renunciation of Interest state that Mr. Faulkner "desires to renounce and relinquish all right, title, 
interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the Estate or Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §75-2-801." 
41. The operative provisions of the Renunciation state, "Now, therefore, in 
consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-801,1, Larry C. Faulkner, 
hereby renounce, relinquish and otherwise forfeit all my right, title, interest, or claim as a 
beneficiary of the Estate of Jennie A. Faulkner as though I had predeceased her." 
42. The Renunciation of Interest was filed in the Second District Court under Civil 
No. 013900149, on May 4, 2001. 
43. Prior to May 4, 2001, the date that the Renunciation of Interest was executed and 
filed with the court, Larry Faulkner had taken possession of items of personal property from the 
Jennie A. Faulkner Trust, including the items listed on the List of Distributions, the "Exhibit B" 
items, and the opal ring. 
44. Larry Faulkner did not disclaim, or attempt to disclaim, his interest in the Jennie A. 
Faulkner Estate or Trust prior to May 4, 2001. 
45. Pursuant to stipulation by the parties and order of the Court dated, July 5, 2001, 
the $29,243.64 in question was deposited in Bank of Utah Account No. 1878442, to be held until 
further order of the Court or stipulation of all the parties (the "Escrowed Funds"). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. §75-2-801 provides: 
(1) A person, or the representative of a person, to whom an interest in or with respect to 
property or an interest therein devolves by whatever means may disclaim it in whole or in 
part by delivering or filing a written disclaimer under this section 
(5) The right to disclaim property or an interest therein is barred by: 
(a) an assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of the property or 
interest, or a contract therefor, 
(b) a written waiver of the right to disclaim; 
(c) an acceptance of the property or interest or a benefit under it; or 
(d) a sale of the property or interest under judicial sale made before the disclaimer 
is made. 
2. While U.C.A. §75-2-801(1) allows partial or fractional disclaimers, Mr. 
Faulkner's disclaimer is clearly not a disclaimer of a partial or fractional interest. 
3. It is uncontroverted that in his disclaimer executed on May 4, 2001, Larry 
Faulkner purported to "renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all [his] right, title, interest, or 
claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner." 
4. It is also uncontroverted that Mr. Faulkner took items of personal property 
belonging to the Trust prior to executing his disclaimer. 
5. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-2-80 l(5)(c), Mr. Faulkner was barred from 
disclaiming his interest in the Trust because he had already taken and accepted property from the 
Trust as a beneficiary of the trust. The court finds that Mr. Faulkner's Renunciation of Interest 
was invalid and inoperative. 
6. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §75-2-80 l(5)(c), a disclaimer is also barred if the 
intended disclaimant has taken a benefit from the property sought to be disclaimed. 
7. The Court finds, alternatively, that Mr. Faulkner obtained a benefit from the Trust 
in that Mr. Faulkner receives all of his support and maintenance from his wife who is the other 
residuary beneficiary of the Trust. Mr. Faulkner's receipt of a benefit from the Trust bars and 
invalidates his disclaimer of the Trust property. 
8. Since disclosures permitted under U.C.A. §75-2-801 are in derogation of the 
statutory and common law rights of creditors, disclaimers should be strictly construed. The 
language of Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer states that he his disclaiming "all [his] right, title, 
interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner." Mr. Faulkner's disclaimer 
does not disclaim a partial or fractional interest. The Court will not rewrite Mr. Faulkner's 
disclaimer to say something it does not say. The disclaimer, as executed by Mr. Faulkner, is 
barred and invalidated by Mr. Faulkner's prior acceptance of Trust personalty. 
9. On May 10, 2001, at the time the Writ of Garnishment was served upon Renee 
Faulkner, she was in possession of $29,243.64, which rightfully belonged to Larry Faulkner as 
a beneficiary of the Trust of Jennie A. Faulkner. 
10. For each of die foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Mr. Faulkner's 
Renunciation of Interest was invalid. 
11. The Motion to Quash the Writ of Garnishment should be denied, and Plaintiffs 
should be granted judgment against Renee Faulkner on the Traverse Complaint, for the sum of 
$29,243.64, plus costs pursuant to Rules 64D(i) and 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
with post-judgment interest thereon as provided by law. 
10 
12. Pursuant to the Writ of Garnishment, Renee Faulkner, as Garnishee Defendant 
should be hereby ordered to deliver to Plaintiffs' counsel the Escrowed Funds which shall be 
applied as a credit to the Garnishee Judgment 
DATED this 0 day of //vLflsj , 2002. 
' BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
Judge'Stanton M. T&ylor 
District Court Judge 
Brad C. Smith 
Attorney for Renee Faulkner and 
Larry Faulkner 
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Exhibit C 
Faulkner's Disclaimer 
Renunciation of Interest 
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner is a beneficiary of the Trust of Jennie A Faulkner dated 
29 December 1992, and amended on 18 July 1997; and 
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner's beneficial interest is a joint interest with his wife, 
Renee Faulkner; and 
Whereas, Lawrence C. Faulkner desires to renounce and relinquish all right, title, interest 
or claim as a beneficiary of the estate or trust of Jennie A. Faulkner, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-801. 
Now therefore, in consideration of the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-
801,1, Lawrence C. Faulkner, hereby renounce, relinquish, and otherwise forfeit all my right, 
title, interest, or claim as a beneficiary of the estate of Jennie A. Faulkner as though I had 
predeased her. 
DATED this ^ dav of April, 2001. 
County of Weber ) 
:ss 
State of Utah ) 
On this 4^ day of April 2001, personally appeared before me, Lawrence C. Faulkner, 
Deing personally known to me or having identified himself by photographic identification, and 
said and deposed that he has read the foregoing document, that he understands the terms of the 
foregoing document, and that he has executed it as his free and voluntary act. 
BRAD&6MBTH 
mmpv8uc*swtoium 
W6WA3HNGTONBt» 
OQDEHUr 04401 
COMM.EXR 11-06-2001 
Notary Public 
